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ABSTRACT
It is important to understand the factors that influence a country's transition from the production of
low-quality to high-quality products since the production of high-quality goods is often viewed as
a pre-condition for export success and, ultimately, for economic development. In this paper, we provide
the first evidence that countries' import tariffs affect the rate at which they upgrade the quality of their
products. We analyze the effect of import competition on quality upgrading using highly disaggregated
export data to the U.S. from fifty-six countries in 10,000 products using a novel approach to measure
quality. As predicted by recent distance to the frontier models, we find that lower tariffs are associated
with quality upgrading for products close to the world quality frontier, whereas lower tariffs discourage
quality upgrading for products distant from the frontier.
Mary Amiti
International Research
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty St
New York, NY 10045-0001
Mary.Amiti@ny.frb.org
Amit K. Khandelwal
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
Uris Hall 606, 3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
and NBER
ak2796@columbia.eduCompetition and Quality Upgrading 2
1. Introduction
A fundamental question facing governments is how policy can promote economic growth.
It is generally accepted that innovation is a key channel to fostering growth, however, it
is less clear how to create the right incentives to encourage innovation. Empirical studies
have found that innovation increases with competition (see Geroski 1995, Nickell 1996 and
Blundell, Griﬃth, and Van Reenen 1999), yet these ﬁndings were at odds with theories from
industrial organization that suggest that competition could actually discourage innovation.
According to theory, pro-competitive policies may cause ﬁrms to under-invest if they are
able to capture only a fraction of the beneﬁts of innovation while incurring the full invest-
ment costs. This appropriation argument dates back to a negative relationship between
competition and innovation suggested by Schumpeter (1943). Policies that protect innova-
tion rents could therefore encourage incumbent ﬁrms to increase investment. More recent
theories, though, suggest that the relationship between competition and growth need not
be monotonic. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), Aghion and Howitt (2005), and Acemoglu,
Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) show that policies that initially facilitate growth could in fact
inhibit growth at later stages of economic development. Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt,
and Prantil (henceforth, ABGHP, 2009) develops an industry model in which a ﬁrm’s re-
sponse of innovation to competition policy or increased entry threat depends on how far it
is from the world technology frontier.
Subsequent empirical studies have found support for this nonmonotonic relationship
between competition and innovation (see, for example, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth,
and Howitt, henceforth, ABBGH 2005, ABGHP 2009, and Vandenbussche, Aghion, and
Meghir 2004). However, all these studies have been conﬁned to either single country analysis
or aggregate cross-country studies. Empirically investigating these theories with aggregate
country data is diﬃcult because competition policy can take many forms and is likely
to be correlated with other country characteristics, such as relative factor endowments.
While industry studies within countries circumvent problems associated with cross-country
analysis, the ﬁndings are diﬃcult to generalize across countries that span a wide income
distribution. The lack of internationally comparable measures of growth at a micro level
has prevented previous studies from adopting a hybrid approach that takes account of cross
country and within country characteristics.
In this paper, we analyze the nonmonotonic relationship between competition policy
and innovation formalized in these theories using highly disaggregate data. Our sample
comprises 10,000 products across ﬁfty-six countries. We are able to circumvent some of
the problems that have plagued previous studies by using a novel approach that measures
product quality, which serves as our proxy for innovation. We infer a product’s quality
based on the approach by Khandelwal (forthcoming). In our framework, we estimate the
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where, conditional on price, higher quality is assigned to products with higher market
shares. The framework provides quality measures that are internationally comparable across
countries and over time. We can therefore exploit very detailed information on countries’
quality performance to address potential endogeneity concerns in cross-country studies. To
measure competition in each country, we use detailed industry-level tariﬀso ni t si m p o r t s ,
which, again, are comparable across industries and countries. Thus, countries with high
tariﬀ barriers are those where competitive forces are weaker. Moreover, since tariﬀsa r e
a policy instrument, they may be less subject to endogeneity concerns compared to other
measures of competition, such as the Herﬁndahl index, a measure that summarizes the
concentration of ﬁrms, used in many studies. The high level of disaggregation of both the
tariﬀ and the quality measures is crucial for isolating the eﬀects of competition on innovation
that are distinct from other channels, such as changes in a countries’ relative endowments,
product-speciﬁc productivity shocks, changes in consumer demands, or changes in countries’
institutional structures.
To allow for the possibility of a nonmonotonic relationship between competition and
quality upgrading, we draw on models by Aghion and Howitt (2005), ABBGH (2005) and
ABGHP (2009) to guide our empirical analysis. The key idea behind these models is that
the eﬀect of competition on innovation activity depends on ﬁrms’ proximity to the world
technology frontier. These models highlight two forces. First, for ﬁrms far from the tech-
nology frontier, an increase in competition reduces incentives to innovate because ex post
rents from innovation are eroded by new entrants; this idea is similar to the Schumpeterian
appropriability eﬀect of competition. Following ABGHP (2009), we refer to this as the
discouragement eﬀect. As ﬁrms approach the frontier, however, competition can increase
incentives to innovate because it reduces ﬁrms’ pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces
its post-innovation rents. We refer to this force as the escape competition eﬀect.1
We examine predictions of these models by allowing the eﬀect of competition on quality
upgrading, our measure of innovation, to depend on a product’s proximity to the world
frontier, deﬁned as the highest-quality product exported to the U.S. in a given year. Our
empirical results provide support for the nonmonotonic relationship between competition
and quality upgrading predicted by the theory. Products that face a relatively high degree
of competition in their home market (i.e., low import tariﬀs) exhibit relatively slower quality
upgrading when they are distant from the world frontier. In contrast, for products close to
the world frontier, a competitive home market is associated with faster quality upgrading.
Our results are consistent with the nonmonotonic relationship between competition and
innovation found in the industrial organization literature. Moreover, our disaggregated
1ABGHP (2009) refer to this as the “escape-entry” eﬀect which dominates when incumbent ﬁrms are in
a neck-and-neck industry. In Acemgolu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), it is referred to as a “selection eﬀect”;
in their model, pro-competitive policies stimulate innovation when ﬁrms are close to the technology frontier
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approach enables us to study the eﬀects of competition on quality upgrading across a wide
income distribution. We show that the theory has support in both high and low income per
capita countries provided there is a minimum level of institutional quality.2 This result is
intuitive given that, in countries with multi-dimensional sources of market frictions, changes
in import tariﬀs are likely to have limited eﬀects on the competitive pressures faced by
domestic ﬁrms. Thus, the results suggest that a minimum institutional “quality” may be
needed for the mechanisms of the model to operate.
Within the trade literature, there are a number of studies that have analyzed the re-
lationship between tariﬀs and productivity. For instance, ﬁrm-level studies by Pavcnik
(2002), Amiti and Konings (2007) and Topalova (2007), and cross-country studies by Roma-
lis (2006) have found a positive relationship between trade liberalizations and productivity.
Other studies, such as Bustos (2008), ﬁnd a relationship between trade liberalization and
technology adoption. However, our study is the ﬁrst to allow for the potential nonmonotonic
relationship depending on proximity to the frontier using tariﬀs as the competition measure.
Our results suggests that understanding where industries are located along the world fron-
tier is important for understanding its future performance following a trade liberalization.
The support we ﬁnd for a nonmonotonic relationship between import tariﬀsa n dq u a l i t y
growth can also help shed light on why the trade and income growth literature has produced
mixed results. In a survey of this literature, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2002) discuss how the
results are often sensitive to identiﬁcation strategies and controls, and explain the diﬃculty
of disentangling the mechanisms through which trade aﬀects income growth using cross-
country regressions. In this paper, we show that omitting country-year ﬁxed eﬀects, which
of course cannot be included in aggregate cross-country regressions, can change the sign on
the tariﬀ coeﬃcient; and how allowing for a more ﬂexible nonmonotonic relationship can
also alter the conclusions. Although we focus on the link between tariﬀ liberalization and
one particular channel of growth - quality grow t h-t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tq u a l i t yg r o w t hh a s
implications for income (see, for instance, Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 2006), our results
oﬀer a lens into the mechanism for the relationship between trade and income growth.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a sketch of the model
in ABGHP (2009) which serves as the basis for our empirical speciﬁcation. In Section 3,
we outline our empirical strategy and the methodology used to infer product quality. In
Section 4, we present the results, and in Section 5, we conclude.
2A sd i s c u s s e di nm o r ed e t a i l e db e l o w ,w er e l yo nt h eW o r l dB a n k ’ sD o i n gB u s i n e s sR e p o r tt oi n f e ra
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2. Model
We draw on the model in ABGHP(2009) to guide our empirical speciﬁcation.3 It is
a multisector Shumpeterian growth model where entry threat aﬀects innovation by in-
cumbents. A ﬁnal good, yt, is produced under perfect competition with a continuum of






α di, α ∈ (0,1), (1)
where At (i) is the productivity associated with input i.T h eﬁnal good is used as capital in
producing intermediates. Only two ﬁrms are capable of producing an innovation for each
intermediate input. The model assumes Bertrand competition, so that if two ﬁrms have
equal technology, then proﬁts are zero; and if the two technologies diﬀer, then the leader has
positive proﬁts. It is assumed that the world technology frontier, At grows at an exogenous
rate, γ>1.
There are three possible types of ﬁrms: type 1 ﬁrms are at the frontier, with At−1(i)=
At−1;t y p e2ﬁrms are one step behind the frontier, with At−1(i)=At−2;a n dt y p e3ﬁrms
are two steps behind the frontier, with At−1(i)=At−3. Innovation allows the incumbent to
increase productivity by γ and keep up with the growth of the frontier, but technological
progress is step-by-step. The last ﬁrm type is automatically upgraded by γ (the model does
not allow for leapfrogging).
I ne a c hp e r i o da n di ne a c ho ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t es ectors, there is only one potential entrant
that can pay an entry cost to enter. It is assumed that when entry occurs, it takes place at
the frontier. Thus, an entrant captures the entire market and becomes the new leading ﬁrm
unless the incumbent leader is also at the frontier after innovation, in which case the new
entrant chooses not to enter. The entrant observes post-innovation technology, thus would
not pay the entry cost if the incumbent was at the frontier because Bertrand competition
would drive proﬁts to zero. An incumbent laggard never invests in innovation because at
best it would catch up to its rival and earn zero proﬁts. Thus in steady state, there are never
two type 1 or type 2 ﬁrms. ABGHP(2009) demonstrate that in equilibrium there are only
three possible states: (1) type 1 leader; (2) type 2 leader; and (3) two type 3 incumbents.
To solve for equilibrium, ABGHP (2009) shows that a ﬁrm chooses its investment z
to maximize the expected net proﬁtg a i nf r o mi n n o v a t i o nl e s st h ec o s to fr e s e a r c ha n d
development. Noting that it is never proﬁtable for a laggard to innovate, they solve the
ﬁrst-order conditions for a state 1 and a state 2 leader. Denote probj as the probability
that the potential entrant pays the cost of entry in sector j, which depends negatively
on an exogenous common cost parameter, Λ, so prob
0
j(Λ) < 0. This cost parameter can be
3We refer the reader to ABGHP (2009) for the full model and to Aghion and Howitt (2005) for an
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interpreted as a measure of competition, with a higher Λ implying less competition. Then in
state 2 sectors, they show that the probability of increasing innovation, ∂z2/∂Λ, is positive
due to the “discouragement eﬀect.” That is, ﬁrms behind the frontier know they cannot
survive entry even if they successfully innovate; thus any policies that reduce the cost of
entry will discourage innovation for ﬁrms behind the frontier. In contrast, in state 1 sectors
where the leader is at the frontier, a reduction in Λ that increases the entry threat increases
innovation: ∂z1/∂Λ < 0. A larger entry threat increases the incumbent leader’s losses from
entry if it does not innovate, thus increasing the incentive to escape entry by innovating.













(γ − 1) > 0. (2)
This implies that for ﬁrms at the frontier (sector 1 ﬁrms), a reduction in the entry cost
(tougher competition) increases innovation and growth. Conversely, for ﬁrms behind the
frontier (sector 2 ﬁrms), a reduction in the entry cost decreases innovation and growth.
3. Empirical Speciﬁcation
The implications of the model are that innovation is a nonmonotonic function of com-
petition that depends on the ﬁrm’s proximity to the world technology frontier:
innovation = f(competition, proximity to the frontier). (3)
To explore this relationship, we need to obtain a measure of innovative activity, proximity
to the frontier, and competition.
3.1. Innovation
Innovative activity may involve developing new production techniques, new products or
upgrading the quality of existing products. Measuring all of these aspects is challenging
because of the complexity of these diﬀerent attributes and the dearth of data that is com-
parable across countries. We overcome some of these diﬃculties by focusing on the quality
element of innovation using a novel approach developed in Khandelwal (forthcoming). We
measure a product’s quality using export data to the United States. We rely on a country’s
exports to the United States rather than its production to infer quality because the trade
data are available at a highly disaggregate level, which is important for our analysis, and
because these data are comparable across countries and time. Moreover, we are likely to
capture the highest quality products within a country given the evidence that exporting
ﬁrms tend to be more productive, employ higher skilled workers, more likely to obtain
International Organization Standard (ISO) certiﬁcations, and produce higher unit value
products relative to nonexporters (e.g., see Bernard et al. 2007, Verhoogen 2008, KuglerCompetition and Quality Upgrading 7
and Verhoogen 2008). There is also evidence that higher unit value goods are exported
to higher income countries (e.g., see Hallak 2006, Bastos and Silva 2009, and Manova and
Zhang 2009).
3.2. Methodology for Measuring Quality
Following Khandelwal (forthcoming), we use a procedure to estimate a product’s quality
from both export prices and market share information. This is in contrast to the literature
in international trade that often uses prices or unit values (value divided by quantity) as
a proxy for quality (e.g., Schott 2004, Hallak 2006). The obvious advantage of using unit
values is that they are easily calculated in the trade data. However, if products possess
both vertical (e.g., comfort) and horizontal (e.g., style) attributes, unit values may be
inappropriate proxies for quality. For example, consider women’s trousers, deﬁned at the
HS 10-digit level (HS 6204624020), exported to the U.S. in 2005 by India and Venezuela.
The unit values (inclusive of transportation and tariﬀ costs) associated with these imports
were $140 and $163, respectively. Under the price-equals-quality assumption, Venezuelan
trousers would be assigned higher quality. However, the income per capita of Venezuela
exceeds India’s by ten-fold and so it is possible that the diﬀerences in unit values also reﬂect,
in part, the wage diﬀerential. Our measure of quality also takes into account diﬀerences in
market shares; thus for two products with identical unit values, the product with a higher
market share is assigned higher quality (how much higher quality depends, as seen below, on
the slope of the demand schedule). Indeed, India exported over 1 million units more than
Venezuela; and after accounting for these diﬀerences in market shares, the methodology
described below assigns a higher quality to Indian trousers, despite lower prices.
To estimate quality, we use a nested logit demand framework, based on Berry (1994).
In this framework, quality is deﬁned as the vertical component of the model and has a
structural deﬁnition as the mean valuation that U.S. consumers attach to an imported
product. The intuition behind this approach is that higher quality is assigned to products
that have higher market shares, conditional on prices. We closely follow the set up in
Khandelwal (forthcoming) and summarize the estimation procedure here.
To understand the nested logit structure, ﬁrst we need to describe how the data are
classiﬁed. We deﬁne products as the HS 10-digit codes, which is the most disaggregated
U.S. trade data classiﬁcation. A U.S. import from a country within a product is called a
variety. All products can be mapped into a coarser 5-digit SITC (revision 3) classiﬁcation
code, which we refer to as the industry. For example, an industry may be men’s knit
shirts, and within this industry, shirts are classiﬁe di n t op r o d u c t st h a tc a nv a r yb yf a b r i c
material (e.g., cotton, wool, etc.). Chinese cotton and Japanese wool shirts are examples of
varieties. We use the HS 10-digit products as the nests for our application. As shown below,
the nested logit allows for more plausible substitution patterns than the logit by allowingCompetition and Quality Upgrading 8
diﬀerences in the correlation among consumer preferences for varieties within a nest than
for varieties across nests.
We derive the structural equation for a single SITC industry, comprising many varieties,
and then estimate this equation separately for each industry (thus we suppress industry
subscripts). Consumer n has preferences for HS product h imported from country c (e.g.,
variety ch)a tt i m et. The consumer purchases the one variety that provides her with the
highest indirect utility, given by
Vncht = λ1,ch + λ2,t + λ3,cht − αpcht +
H X
h=1
μnhtdch +( 1− σ) ncht. (4)
The λ terms represent the variety’s valuation that is common across consumers (notice that
these terms are not subscripted by n). The ﬁrst term, λ1,ch, is the time-invariant valuation
that the consumer attaches to variety ch. The second term, λ2,t, controls for secular time
trends common across all varieties. The λ3,cht term is a variety-time deviation from the ﬁxed
eﬀect that consumers observe but that we as the econometricians do not. Consequently, this
last component of quality is potentially correlated with the variety’s unit value inclusive of
transportation and tariﬀ costs, pcht.
The horizontal component of the model is captured by the random component,
PH
h=1 μnhtdch+  ncht. The term  ncht is assumed to be distributed Type-I extreme value
and explains why a low-quality variety that is expensive is ever purchased. The former term
interacts the common valuation that consumer n places on all varieties within product h,
μnht, with a dummy variable dch that takes a value of 1 if country c’s export lies in product
h. This term generates the nesting framework because it allows consumer n’s preferences
to be more correlated for varieties within product h than for varieties across products.4 For
instance, a consumer who prefers Japanese wool shirts is more likely to prefer other wool
shirts rather than cotton shirts. The nested logit is designed to capture this preference
structure.
An outside-variety completes the demand system. The outside option allows consumers
to choose a domestically produced variety instead of any imported variety. The consumer
chooses this outside option if the utility derived from the outside-variety exceeds that from
purchasing any inside option. The utility of the outside-variety is given by
un0t = λ1,0 + λ2,t + λ3,0t − αp0t + μn0t +( 1− σ) n0t. (5)
The mean utility of the outside variety is normalized to zero; this normalization anchors
the valuations of the inside varieties. In the context here, one can think of the outside
4As discussed in Berry (1994), Cardell (1997) has shown that the distribution of
SH
h=1 μnhtdch is the
unique distribution such that if   is distributed extreme value, then the sum is also distributed type-I extreme
value. The degree of within nest correlation is controlled by σ ∈ (0,1] and is assumed to be identical across
all products. As σ approaches one, the correlation in consumer tastes for varieties within a nest approaches
one; as σ tends to zero, the nested logit converges to the standard logit model.Competition and Quality Upgrading 9
variety as the domestic substitute for imports, and we therefore set the outside variety
market share to one minus the industry’s import penetration. Note that the choice of
the outside variety proxy aﬀects the absolute growth rate of import qualities but not the
relative growth rate because our analysis includes year ﬁxed eﬀects that are common to all




1−s0t ,w h e r eqcht denotes the import quantity of variety ch.T h em a r k e t
shares for imported varieties are then calculated as scht = qcht/MKTt.
The consumer chooses variety ch if Vncht >V nc0h0t. Under the distributional assumptions
for the random component of consumer utility, Berry (1994) has shown that the demand
curve from the preferences in equation (4) is
ln(scht) − ln(s0t)=λ1,ch + λ2,t − αpcht + σln(vscht)+λ3,cht, (6)
where vscht is variety ch’s share within product h at time t (the nest share).5
Since the trade data do not record detailed characteristics of varieties, we exploit the
panel dimension of the data by specifying a time-invariant component of quality (λ1,ch)
with variety ﬁxed eﬀects, and the common quality component (λ2,t)w i t hy e a rﬁxed eﬀects.
The third component of quality, λ3,cht, is not observed and plays the role of the estimation
error.
Since λ3,cht and the nest share are potentially correlated with the variety’s price, instru-
mental variables are required to identify the parameters. We instrument the price with the
variety’s transportation costs, which are obviously correlated with prices but may also be
correlated with quality if ﬁrms ship higher-quality goods in order to lower per unit trans-
port costs. This practice potentially raises concerns that trade costs may be correlated with
a variety’s quality (Hummels and Skiba 2004). However, the exclusion restriction remains
v a l i da sl o n ga st r a n s p o r tc o s t sd on o ta ﬀect deviations from average quality, λ3,cht. In other
words, if an Australian ﬁrm chooses to export higher-quality varieties to the United States
because of distance, the instruments remain valid as long as shocks to transportation costs
do not aﬀect deviations from the ﬁrm’s average quality choice. Indeed, the Washington Ap-
ples phenomenon discussed in Hummels and Skiba (2004) identify the impact of distance on
prices using cross-country variation in distance rather than shocks to transport costs over
time. We also include exchange rates and the interaction of distance to the United States
5If one adopts a logit demand system, the nest share disappears from equation (6). To understand why
this nest share term is important for inferring quality, consider the following example. Imagine there are
two shirts—Japanese wool and Italian cotton—that are identical in every dimension (including prices) and
evenly split the market. We would infer their qualities also to be equal. Now suppose an identical Chinese
cotton shirt enters and the market shares for the cotton shirts are 1/4 each and the wool shirt captures the
remaining 1/2. Without the nesting structure, we would infer that the quality of the Italian cotton shirt has
fallen in half (since its market share has fallen while its price remains the same), even though its underlying
attributes have not changed. The nested logit takes into account the correlated preferences within nests. So
although the market share for the Italian cotton shirt falls, its nest share (vscht) also falls and so its inferred
quality would remain unchanged.Competition and Quality Upgrading 10
with oil prices as additional instruments; these instruments vary at the country-year level.
Finally, vscht is also endogenous, and so we instrument this term with the number of vari-
eties within product h and the number of varieties exported by country c. As is frequently
assumed in the discrete choice literature (e.g., see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995), the
identiﬁcation assumption is that entry and exit of other varieties will be correlated with ch’s
share within the nest, but uncorrelated with quality shocks. This would occur in a model of
monopolistic competition where all varieties are atomistic, or in an oligopoly model where
entry and exit decisions occur in the ﬁr s ts t a g ea n dN a s hp r i c e sa n dq u a l i t i e sa r ec h o s e ni n
the second stage of game.6
A second issue that arises in estimating (6), ﬁrst noted by Feenstra (1994) and also by
Hallak and Schott (2008), is the problem of unobserved or “hidden” varieties. To understand
how hidden varieties could confound the measurement of quality, suppose that the reason
India exported far more women’s trousers than Venezuela was simply that India exported
more unobserved twelve-digit HS varieties (for instance, more colors). If the Venezuelan
and Indian varieties were identically priced with equal market share, then when aggregating
to the observed ten-digit HS level, we would assign a larger market share to the Indian
varieties. From equation (6), India’s estimated quality would be biased upward simply due
to the hidden varieties. Drawing on standard models (e.g., Krugman 1980) that predict
that a the number of varieties produced is increasing in a country’s population, we use the
(log of) population as an additional covariate in (6).
The demand curve that controls for the hidden-varieties problem is given by
ln(scht) − ln(s0t)=λ1,ch + λ2,t − αpcht + σln(nscht)+γ lnpopct + λ3,cht, (7)
where popct is the population in country c. The estimated parameters and the residual of
the regression deﬁne the quality of variety ch at time t as:
λcht ≡ ˆ λ1,ch + ˆ λ2,t + ˆ λ3,cht. (8)
From equation (7), we see that the quality of an imported variety is deﬁned relative to
its market share after controlling for exporter size and price. More generally, our notion
of quality is an attribute that allows a variety’s price to rise without it losing market
share. One potential concern about this interpretation is that many factors unrelated to
quality could aﬀect market shares and therefore confound our measure of quality. However,
6We note that the validity of using a count of varieties to instrument for vscht relies on weaker assump-
tions than those typically made in the discrete choice literature. The discrete choice literature typically
instruments vscht with the average characteristics of varieties (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995). This
practice assumes that the ﬁrms’ quality choices are ﬁxed (or chosen before prices). Here, we only need that
the number of varieties is uncorrelated with the deviation from average quality, λ3,cht. This will be the case
in a model where entry and exit occur prior to the ﬁrms’ quality choice. For example, this occurs in models
where ﬁrms choose quality in the ﬁnal stage of a multi-stage game of location, price, and quality decisions
(e.g., Vogel 2008).Competition and Quality Upgrading 11
it is important to note that this set of factors is made much smaller by conditioning on
prices. For example, a variety may have a large market share if the exporting country is
geographically close to the United States. However, since the price includes transportation
costs the quality estimate is not capturing purely gravity eﬀects such as distance.7
3.2.1. Proximity to Frontier
We estimate equation 7 separately for each SITC (revision 3) industry and use the esti-
mated parameters of the regressions to deﬁne the qualities according to (8).8 We construct
the frontier measures by ﬁrst taking a monotonic transformation of the quality measures to
ensure that all qualities are non-negative: λF
cht =e x p [ λcht].W ed e ﬁne a variety’s proximity








where the max operator chooses the maximum λF
cht within a product-year and PFcht ∈ (0,1].
For varieties close to the frontier, this measure is close to one. For varieties far from the
frontier, this measure is close to zero.
3.3. Competition
To measure a country’s competitive environment, we collect disaggregated import tariﬀs
for each country in our sample. The tariﬀ data are obtained from WITS and are speciﬁed
at the HS 6-digit level and over time. That is, we measure the competitive environment of
an HS6 industry in South Korea by South Korea’s tariﬀs on imports in that industry. The
advantage of using tariﬀs as our measure for competition within a country is that they are
readily available at a disaggregate level and comparable across countries and time. Impor-
tantly, there is widespread evidence that tariﬀ reductions result in pro-competitive pressures
in the liberalizing countries which result in both a reallocation of resources towards more
competitive ﬁrms and exit of ineﬃcient ﬁrms.9 An alternative measure of competition often
used in studies is a Herﬁndahl concentration index, however these measures are unavailable
across a large sample of countries necessary for our study. Moreover, while concentration
measures have the advantage of encompassing a broader concept of competition, it is not
possible to discern what policies are causing the diﬀerences in concentration across indus-
tries, since it is an outcome of many policies.
7Note that deﬁning quality to be inclusive of a residual is analogous to the productivity literature that
interprets total factor productivity as the residual from conditioning output on observable inputs.
8Note that separate industry regressions imply that quality cannot be compared across industries. We
include appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects in our analysis below to account for this.
9For instance, see Levinsohn (1993), Pavcnik (2002), and the comprehensive survey article by Tybout
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4. Data Description
To estimate quality, we use U.S. import data from 1990 to 2005 at the HS 10-digit
level. Since unit values are notoriously noisy (GAO 1995), prior to estimating the demand
systems in equation (7), we trim the data along three dimensions: we drop variety-year
observations above or below the 1st and 99th percentile of unit values, exclude varieties
with annual price increases of more than 200 percent or price declines of more than 66
percent, and drop varieties with export quantities of fewer than ten. The quality estimates
obtained from equation (8) are also noisy and so we trim the qualities at the 5th and 95th
percentiles. We also drop any observations with ﬁve-year quality growth outside the 1st
and 99th percentiles. We trim along ﬁve year growth intervals since our dependent variable
below will be deﬁned as quality growth over 5-year intervals.
We obtain six-digit HS import tariﬀsf o rﬁfty-six countries for 1990, 1995, and 2000
from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. The sample of
countries is limited by the availability of tariﬀ data for those years.10 The world quality
frontier for each product in each year is deﬁned from the set of countries for which we have
tariﬀ data. The proximity to the frontier for each country’s products in each year is then
matched to its import tariﬀs. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the change in quality,
proximity to frontier, and tariﬀ levels for OECD and non-OECD countries,11 as well as
statistics for countries classiﬁed as having strong and weak business environments, high
DB and low DB, which we deﬁne below. The table shows that non-OECD countries have
faster quality growth than OECD countries, and they also have higher rates of protection.
The table also shows that non-OECD countries have slightly higher proximity to frontier
measures than OECD countries, but this is related to product composition. Controlling for
product-year ﬁxed eﬀects, there is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between
proximity to the frontier and income per capita.
As would be expected, the quality estimates indicate that richer countries export higher
quality varieties within products.12 Thus, on average, more advanced countries sit atop
a product’s quality ladder while developing countries are further from the frontier. The
relationship between income and quality in 2005 is seen in Figure 1. The left panel of
Figure 1 plots the proportion of the total number of products a country exports for which it
is the quality “leader”, PFcht =1 , against its income per capita, showing there is a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant relationship.13 Similarly, there is a positive relationship between
10If tariﬀ data were unavailable for a particular year, we included the data for the preceding year. Note
that tariﬀs are common for all countries within the European Union.
11OECD countries include all those that joined the OECD before our sample period in 1990. Countries in
our sample that joined the OECD after 1990 include Mexico in 1994, and South Korea and Poland in 1996.
Taiwan is a member but cannot vote.
12This was shown in Khandelwal (forthcoming) and consistent with ﬁndings in the previous literature.
13The income per capita and population variables are obtained from the the World Development IndicatorsCompetition and Quality Upgrading 13
income and the fraction of highest-priced varieties in the right panel of the ﬁgure. Notice
in this panel that the positive relationship is steeper than the quality-based measure. In
particular, China is a clear outlier; although China exported the highest-priced variety in 9
percent of products in 2005, the quality-based measure indicates that China was the leader in
44 percent of the total number of products it exported to the U.S. There are several reasons
for this discrepancy. First, although China exports low-priced varieties, it has exceptionally
high market shares (it has the highest quantity in 59 percent of the products it exports),
particularly for labor-intensive products. That is, the procedure above yields high quality
estimates for China because its market shares are larger than the predicted market shares
given its price and the estimated elasticity of demand. Thus, the methodology will record
higher quality for China in these products. Second, trade statistics are recorded on a total
value basis rather than a value-added basis. Given the importance of processing trade for
Chinese exports, its value added will vary across sectors. For example, the Apple iPod is
“made in China” even though China’s value added accounts for a fraction of the production
(Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2007). More generally, Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008)
estimate that China’s value added in computers may be as low 5 percent. If the U.S. Census
collected value-added trade data, China’s inferred quality would presumably be much lower.
Note that in Section 5.3, we will adopt several robustness checks in our analysis, including
using unit values as a proxy for quality, and excluding China from the analysis and frontier
deﬁnition.
5. Quality Upgrading and Competition Results
With the import tariﬀs and quality measures in hand, we can analyze the eﬀect of
competition on quality upgrading as in equation 3, allowing for the discouragement and
escape-competition forces. We use the following empirical speciﬁcation to relate quality
growth to import tariﬀs, proximity to the frontier, and the interaction of the two, which
allows for a nonmonotonic relationship highlighted in ABGHP (2009):14
∆lnλF
cht = αht+αct+β1PFcht−5+β2tariﬀch,t−5+β3(PFch,t−5∗tariﬀch,t−5)+εcht.(10)
The dependent variable, ∆lnλF
cht, is the change in a variety’s quality between period t and
t−5. All the explanatory variables are in levels for the period t−5.O u rs p e c i ﬁcation includes
both product-year ﬁxed eﬀects (αht) and country-year ﬁxed eﬀects (αct) which are critical to
the analysis. The product-year ﬁxed eﬀects deal with two issues. One, because the qualities
are estimated separately across industries, the quality estimates are only comparable within
the industry or product. Including the product-year eﬀects ensures that the estimation only
exploits the variation between comparable qualities. Two, product-year ﬁxed eﬀects control
database.
14ABGHP (2009) speciﬁes a similar estimating equation in their context.Competition and Quality Upgrading 14
for shocks that are common to all varieties within a product such as demand shocks or
world-wide technology shocks that could also inﬂuence quality upgrading. The country-year
ﬁxed eﬀects sweep out country-level shocks such as technological shocks, changes in relative
endowments, and changes in institutions that aﬀect competition. Thus, this speciﬁcation
ﬂexibly controls for diﬀerent shocks that may be correlated with tariﬀ changes and aﬀect
quality growth.
The ABGHP model suggest that β2 > 0 and β3 < 0 (see equation 2). Thus, a fall in
tariﬀs would spur a variety’s quality growth in subsequent periods only if the product variety
is close to the world quality frontier (PFcht−5 close to 1); this is consistent with the escape
competition eﬀect discussed above. In contrast, if a product variety is a long way from the
frontier, a fall in tariﬀs could reduce quality upgrading due to the discouragement eﬀect.
That is, products a long way from the frontier need high tariﬀs to protect rents in order to
promote quality upgrading. Note that β1 < 0 implies that varieties that are far from the
frontier (PFcht−5 close to 0) experience faster quality upgrading, implying convergence in
quality.
5.1. Results
Before estimating equation (10), we ﬁrst look for a monotonic relationship between
competition and quality growth by regressing the growth in a variety’s quality on the home
market’s import tariﬀs and product-year ﬁxed eﬀects, as in the trade and growth literature.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 shows that a fall in tariﬀs is associated with slower quality
upgrading. However, once we include country-year ﬁxed eﬀects in column 2, to control for
factors such as changes in a country’s relative factor endowments or technology shocks,
t h es i g no nt h et a r i ﬀ coeﬃcient switches sign, and is now negative indicating that a fall in
tariﬀs is associated with faster quality upgrading. These results highlight the importance of
controlling for country-year eﬀects that may be correlated with industry level competition
measures such as tariﬀs. In all subsequent regressions, we therefore include both country-
year and product-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Next, we examine whether the relationship between quality upgrading and tariﬀsd e -
pends on a variety’s proximity to the frontier according to the baseline regression in (10).
Column 3 shows there is a negative coeﬃcient on the lag proximity to the frontier, which
implies a faster catch-up for varieties far from the frontier. The positive coeﬃcient on tariﬀs
and the negative coeﬃcient on the interaction of tariﬀs with the proximity to frontier pro-
vide support for the eﬀects highlighted in ABGHP (2009). The negative coeﬃcient on the
interaction implies that the varieties close to the world frontier are more likely to upgrade
quality in response to tougher competition in the domestic market (the escape-competition
eﬀect). And the positive coeﬃcient on the linear tariﬀ variable implies that tariﬀs are likely
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eﬀect). Thus, the results support the theory of a non-monotonic relationship between tariﬀs
and quality upgrading.
In column 4, we examine heterogeneity in the discouragement and escape-competition
eﬀects by allowing for separate eﬀects for OECD and non-OECD countries. The results
hold across both groups but the magnitudes of the tariﬀ coeﬃcients are much larger for
OECD countries. For OECD varieties that are distant from the frontier (PFcht−5 close
to 0), a 10 percentage-point fall in tariﬀsi sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha4 . 2p e r c e n tf a l li nq u a l i t y
upgrading. However, for OECD varieties close to the frontier, a fall in tariﬀsh a st h e
opposite eﬀect: a 10 percentage-point fall in tariﬀs is associated with a 5.6 percent increase
in quality upgrading. For non-OECD varieties far from the frontier, a 10 percentage-point
fall in tariﬀs is associated with a 1.1 percent fall in quality upgrading; and for varieties close
to the frontier a 10 percentage-point fall in tariﬀs is associated with a 1.3 percent growth
in quality.
5.2. Institutions and Quality Upgrading
The results in column 4 of Table 2 raise the question as to why there are larger quality
responses in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries as tariﬀs change. For the eﬀects
in the theory to be present, market forces need to be able to operate. In particular, the po-
tential for entry and exit of ﬁr m si sc r u c i a lf o rt a r i ﬀs to invoke more competition in the home
market. However, nontariﬀ barriers, bureaucratic red tape, and other entry regulations are
likely to imply heterogeneity in the impact of tariﬀs on the competitive environment across
countries. In countries with more regulation, additional domestic reforms may be needed
so that lower tariﬀs induce further competition in the market.
We test for heterogenous eﬀects in the tariﬀ-frontier interaction coeﬃcient according to
institutional quality in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. To assess the quality of a country’s
institutions, we rely on a measure of the regulatory environment from the World Bank’s
Doing Business Survey.15 The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a
better business environment. We separate countries into two groups, with HDB comprising
countries with a doing-business indicator greater than the median, and LDB comprising
countries with a doing business indicator lower than the median.16 Column 1 shows that for
countries with weak business environments, the magnitudes and signiﬁcance on the tariﬀ
variables are much lower than for countries with strong business environments, with the
coeﬃcient on the linear tariﬀ term insigniﬁcant.
15We construct an aggregate Doing Business Index by following the procedure outlined in World Bank
(2005). The Doing Business database tracks constraints along several dimensions, including the ease of
starting a business, enforcing contracts, obtaining credit, hiring and ﬁring, etc. We compute each country’s
percentile ranking for each outcome. The aggregate Doing Business measure takes the (simple) average of a
country’s percentile rankings across the outcomes. A higher value indicates an environment more conducive
to conducting business.
16See Table 1 for the list of countries classiﬁed as above and below the median Doing Business index.Competition and Quality Upgrading 16
Interestingly, the business environment indicator is picking up an eﬀect beyond diﬀer-
ences in income per capita. To see this, we allow for additional ﬂexibility in the coeﬃcients
for strong and weak business environments further broken down by OECD and non-OECD
countries in the middle panel of Table 3 (columns 2a and 2b). The results indicate that
even non-OECD countries characterized by strong business environments display both the
discouragement and the escape-competition forces (see upper panel of column 2b). Yet,
for countries characterized by weak doing business indicators the coeﬃcients on the tariﬀ
variables are insigniﬁcant on both tariﬀ terms for both OECD countries and non-OECD
countries, and the coeﬃcient on the tariﬀ term for non-OECD countries becomes nega-
tive (see lower panel).17 This result suggests that a minimum institutional “quality,” and
not simply diﬀerences in income per capita, is required for the two forces to operate. In
particular, the lack of support for the models among weaker business-climate countries ap-
pears consistent with a variant on the Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) model that
discusses how political economy factors can inhibit the escape-competition eﬀect from op-
erating (see section 5.2 of Acemoglu et al. 2006). Since countries with poorer business
climates are unlikely to ﬁt the theory, we restrict the subsequent analysis to the set of
countries characterized by a relatively stronger business environment.
In column 3, we therefore reestimate equation (10) with only the sample of countries
with business environments above the median. The results indicate that for varieties far
from the frontier, a 10 percentage point fall in tariﬀs is associated with a 5.2 percent decline
in quality growth, while an equivalent tariﬀ decline for varieties close to the frontier is
associated with a 3.8 percent increase in quality growth. To get a sense of the economic
signiﬁcance of these point estimates, we evaluate what a 10 percentage point change in
tariﬀs implies for varieties close to the frontier and for those distant from the frontier, and
compare these predicted changes to the actual change in quality for these varieties. Thus,
for varieties close to the frontier (PF > 0.9), the predicted mean change in quality is 3
percent, whereas the actual mean change in quality for these varieties is 13 percent. This
calculation implies that a 10 percentage point change in tariﬀs can account for around 20
percent of the actual change in quality. An analogous calculation for varieties distant from
the frontier (PF < 0.1), implies that a 10 percentage point change in tariﬀs can account
for around 10 percent of the actual change in quality.
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the key results of the nonmonotonic rela-
tionship between competition and quality upgrading predicted by ABGHP (2009) for the
set of countries with strong business environments, highlighting the discouragement and
17Note that there are only two countries, Greece and Portugal, in the LDB-OECD grouping. The alterna-
tive OECD group, with all current members, would add Mexico to that subgroup, which results in signiﬁcant
tariﬀ terms. One explanation for this ﬁnding is that the busines climate in the maquiladora region of Mexico,
where the majority of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. originate, are not accurately reﬂe c t e di nt h eD Bm e a s u r e .
More importantly, the results for all the other three groupings are unaﬀected by the OECD deﬁnition.Competition and Quality Upgrading 17




cht = ˆ β1PFcht−5 + ˆ β2tariﬀcht−5 + ˆ β3(PFcht−5 ∗ tariﬀcht−5)
against the PFcht−5, evaluated at the 10th (dashed line) and 90th tariﬀ percentiles. The
downward sloping lines indicate convergence in the data; varieties far from the frontier
experience faster quality upgrading than those that are proximate to the frontier. The
predicted quality growth line evaluated at the 90th percentile tariﬀ (a 20 percent tariﬀ)i s
a clock-wise rotation of the 10th percentile tariﬀ (a 0 percent tariﬀ), and this reﬂects the
two forces. For varieties far from the frontier, moving from a high tariﬀ to a low tariﬀ is
associated with a decrease in the rate of quality upgrading, which is consistent with the
Schumpeterian discouragement eﬀect. However, for varieties close to the frontier, moving
from a high to a low tariﬀ is associated with a faster rate of quality upgrading, which
illustrates the escape-competition eﬀect.
Khandelwal (forthcoming) notes that products diﬀer in their scope for quality diﬀeren-
tiation, where some products are characterized by a large dispersion of qualities, or “long”
quality ladders, while other productsare characterized by a smaller dispersion of quality,
or “short” quality ladders.18 These diﬀerences, which may be due to either technological
diﬀerences or consumer preferences, imply that products will diﬀer in their scope for quality
upgrading according to their quality ladder lengths. In Table 4, we interact all the variables
with an HS 10-digit product’s initial period quality “ladder” measure, which captures a
product’s scope for quality diﬀerentiation (see Khandelwal, forthcoming), to see if there
is more quality upgrading in products with higher quality ladders. The quality ladder is
measured as the (log) diﬀerence between the best and the worst quality within a product
in the baseline year, 1990. The results show that the response of quality upgrading to
changes in tariﬀs is larger in magnitude in products that possess a higher scope for quality
diﬀerentiation. This is intuitive, as we should expect limited quality upgrading in markets
in which signiﬁcant quality upgrading is not feasible due either to technological constraints
or consumer preferences.
5.3. Robustness
In the remaining tables, we check the robustness of the results. One potential concern
is that the proximity variable is measured with error due to randomness or outliers of
the highest quality variety. In Table 5, we demonstrate that our results are robust to
alternative measures of the world frontier. In column 1, we check the sensitivity of the
results by excluding varieties at the world frontier (and so exclude observations for which
18A market’s intrinisic scope for quality diﬀerentiation is closely related to an escalation principle developed
in Sutton (1998). Other papers that rely on hetergeneity in the scope for quality diﬀerences include Kugler
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PFcht−5 =1 ). In column 2, we drop the top 2 varieties and redeﬁne the frontier in equation
(9) using the third highest quality variety, rather than the maximum. In column 3, we
redeﬁne the frontier based on the sample of varieties exported by HDB countries. In column
4, we redeﬁne the frontier using qualities inferred from the data set after excluding China’s
exports. Recall that in Section 4, we noted that China’s export quality may be overstated
because of the nature of processing trade and because the export data record export values
rather than value added. To check that our results are not driven by this, we exclude
China’s exports to the U.S. from the data, re-estimate quality using equation (7), and
redeﬁne the proximity to frontier measures excluding China. In column 4, we report the
baseline speciﬁcation using these (China-excluded) quality measures. Table 5 illustrates
that the results are robust across all of these alternative measures of the world frontier.
In our ﬁnal robustness check of the frontier measure, we reestimate equation (10) using
u n i tv a l u e s ,t h em o r ec o m m o np r o x yf o r quality in international trade.19 Speciﬁcally, we
deﬁne the proximity to the frontier based on how far a variety’s price is from the maximum
price, and deﬁne the dependent variable as the change in log prices.20 Column 5 shows that
the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are similar to our baseline estimates; for varieties close to
the unit value frontier, there is a negative relationship between tariﬀs and subsequent price
growth, and for varieties far from the frontier, there is a positive association. This result
shows that the discouragement and escape competition eﬀects appear when using prices,
instead of the alternative measure of quality proposed by Khandelwal (forthcoming).
In Table 6, we address issues surrounding omitted variables, endogeneity and selection.
First, a potential concern is that ﬁrms are upgrading quality in response to lower tariﬀs
on intermediate inputs rather than tariﬀso nﬁnal goods. As input tariﬀsf a l l ,ﬁrms can
access cheaper higher quality inputs, which can lead to higher quality outputs. If tariﬀs
on intermediate inputs and ﬁnal goods are correlated, this omitted variable could bias our
coeﬃcients. In column 1 of Table 6, we include input tariﬀs in the baseline speciﬁcation
and ﬁnd that it has the expected negative sign, but it is insigniﬁcant.21 More importantly,
the signiﬁcance and magnitudes of all the other variables are unaﬀected by the inclusion of
input tariﬀs.
Second, there may be endogeneity concerns arising from countries possibly liberalizing
their industries selectively based on forces that we are unable to observe. For instance,
if countries receive productivity shocks that enable them to improve the quality of their
products, pressures against liberalizing those markets may subside. To the extent that
19See Schott (2004), Hallak (2006), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) and Johnson (2009).
20We exclude observations that report unit value changes above the 99th and below the1st percentiles.
21Interestingly, reestimating column 1 of table 5 on the countries below the median DB results in a
signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on input tariﬀs. This is consistent with research on developing countries that
shows lower input tariﬀs improves access to higher quality foreign inputs (e.g., Halpern, Koren, Szeidl 2009,
and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova 2008) and signiﬁcantly raises productivity (see Amiti
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these shocks are country-speciﬁc, the country-year ﬁxed eﬀects will control for productivity
shocks. Likewise, productivity (or demand) shocks that are common across all varieties
within a product will be captured by the product-year ﬁxed eﬀects. However, productivity
shocks could be market-industry speciﬁc. To address this concern, we include the change in
a country’s total exports to the world for each HS 6-digit industry by year. The change in
industry-level exports for each country is a plausible proxy for productivity shocks: higher
productivity shocks are likely to be reﬂected in higher export growth.22 In column 2 of Table
6, we see that while the change in exports is positively correlated with quality upgrading, its
inclusion leaves the key results unchanged. Moreover, the magnitudes are extremely close
to the baseline results reported in column 3 of Table 3.
We further address potential endogeneity concerns by exploiting a speciﬁc liberalization
episode: the ending of textile and clothing (T&C) quotas under the Multiﬁber Arrangement
(MFA) in 2005. A major breakthrough in the Uruguay Round was the agreement by devel-
oped countries to end their stringent quotas on developing countries’ T&C exports.While
the liberalization episode was anticipated, the quota removal was plausibly exogenous for
countries that exported T&C because of the WTO mandate to end the quota regime.23
In 1995, the U.S. published the HS product schedule to phase out the quotas over ten
years. Brambilla, Khandelwal and Schott (2008) show that China’s T&C exports surged
following MFA quota removals (it was eligible for quota removals after joining the WTO).
The surge was most pronounced in the products in which China was “bound”—products in
which China’s quota ﬁll-rates exceeded 90 percent. After the quotas were removed, China’s
exports of bounded products immediately increased by more than 450 percent. Brambilla
et al. (2008) show that with few exceptions (notably Bangladesh and India), virtually all
countries’ T&C exports to the U.S. contracted because of China’s export explosion.24 Thus,
China’s exports following the end of the MFA represents a substantial increase in product
market competition for T&C HS products, and especially in the set of products that China
was bound.
We exploit the MFA episode by restricting our analysis to the T&C products that
were covered by the MFA, and we assign an indicator variable—Bh— if China was subject
to binding quotas in that product.25 Based on Brambilla et al. (2008), product market
competition was the most severe in the bound products. We then estimate an analog to
22We obtain a country’s total exports to the world, by HS6, from the UN Comtrade database.
23Nonetheless, the U.S. did reimpose quotas on China’s expots in a handful of T&C HS codes in 2006.
However, the reimposition of the quotas was due to China’s export surge in 2005. The lobbying for new
quotas therefore precisely reﬂects the substantial increase in product market competition in 2005, the last
year of our sample.
24This ﬁnding underscores the point that the quotas actually ensured gauranteed market access for many
countries’ textile and clothing exports.
25We choose 1991 as the year to determine whether or not China was binding in the product because this
is the earliest year for which the binding quota information is available at the HS level. China was bound
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the baseline speciﬁcation in equation (10) on the set of T&C products:
∆lnλF
cht = αht + αct + β1PFcht−5 + β2(PFch,t−5 ∗ Bh)+εcht.( 1 1 )
The speciﬁcation in (11) regresses quality upgrading on product-year and country-year ﬁxed
eﬀects, the lag proximity to frontier, and its interaction with Bh.26 We again restrict the
analysis to the countries deﬁned as having a relatively stronger business climate. Since
China only became eligible for quota removals after it entered the WTO in December 2001,
we focus on the period from 2000 to 2005. As before, we should observe β1 < 0;v a r i e t i e s
that are far from the frontier experience faster growth due to convergence. The coeﬃcient
of interest is β2 which captures the diﬀerential quality upgrading in bound and unbound
products according to a variety’s PF.T h i s c o e ﬃcient should be positive; varieties that
are close to the frontier should experience relatively faster quality upgrading in China’s
bound products. We report the results in column 3 of Table 6. Consistent with the theory
and our earlier evidence, we observe that quality upgrading among high PF varieties is
faster in products that faced stiﬀer competition over this period. We also run an additional
placebo test by including the earlier periods of our sample. Since China’s exports remained
constrained by quotas prior to 2000, product market competition should not have increased
in the B products in 1990-95 and 1995-00. We check this placebo test by interacting PF
and PF ∗ B with a PostWTO indicator that takes a value of one in period 2000-05 and
a value of zero in periods 1990-95 and 1995-00. The coeﬃcient on the triple interaction
term is statistically signiﬁcant implying that, as shown in the previous column, there is a
diﬀerential change in quality upgrading across China’s bound and unbound products after
China’s WTO entry. Moreover, there is no statistical diﬀerence between quality upgrading
across products in the periods before China’s WTO entry. These ﬁndings are entirely
consistent with product market competition stiﬀening in the bound products in the ﬁnal
period of our sample, but having no diﬀerential impact in the earlier years.27 Thus, the
predictions of the model and our baseline results are veriﬁed using the MFA shock.
A related concern with the baseline speciﬁcation is that the coeﬃcients on PFch,t−5
and (PFcht−5∗tariﬀcht−5) might be downward biased be c a u s e ,a l le l s ee q u a l ,ah i g hλch,t−5
implies a high PFch,t−5 but a low ∆lnλcht. Following Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti
(2006), we therefore instrument PFch,t−5 (and the interactions) with its 5-year lag value.
Column 5 of Table 6 shows that the results are robust, with the coeﬃcients on the proximity
to frontier and the interaction becoming a little smaller in magnitude (compare with column
3 of Table 3). The results are also unaﬀected by the inclusion of the growth in world exports
in the instrumental variables estimation.
26Note that because Bh is time-invariant, we are only able to identify the ineraction eﬀect.
27Note that we do not report the interaction PF∗PostWTO in the table for readibility purposes. This
coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant which is consistent with product market competition not changing substantially
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Third, an alternative source of bias could arise from selection. If a country does not
export a particular product we do not observe the quality of that good. Further, the
observation is only included in the estimation if the quality is observed in both periods t and
t−5.I ti sd i ﬃcult to sign the selection bias since it is likely to depend on how tariﬀsa ﬀect
entry and exit, and where the varieties are located on the PF distribution. For example,
suppose lower tariﬀs result in a country-product pair exiting from our sample. While its
quality change would be missing (the current period quality is not observed), one might
expect its quality to have fallen (i.e., its quality-adjusted price rises to the point where no
U.S. consumer chooses to import the variety). If the variety was already far away from the
frontier, then our coeﬃcient on tariﬀ (β2) is biased downwards (that is, it is not positive
enough). If the exiting variety was close to the frontier, then the interaction coeﬃcient
(β3) is also biased downwards implying that the estimated coeﬃcient is “too negative”.
On the other hand, if lower tariﬀs result in more varieties entering the sample, then the
selection bias implies that our coeﬃcients are biased upwards. This is because while the
quality change for entering varieties is missing (because the previous period quality is not
observed), entry into our sample can be viewed as a positive change in quality. Thus, for
varieties distant from the frontier, our estimate of β2 is biased upwards (that is, it is “too
positive”), while for varieties close to the frontier, the baseline estimate of β3 is not negative
enough. This makes it diﬃcult to sign the overall bias on both coeﬃcients due any selection
issues. Nonetheless, to address this selection issue, we implement a two-step Heckman
correction. For this estimation, we use freight costs that a country would have to incur
if it were to export that product. This variable plausibly aﬀects entry and exit decisions
into the U.S. export market but does not aﬀect the quality. We calculate this potential
freight cost by taking the freight cost of the closest neighboring country that does export
that product. The ﬁrst stage probit (column 6) shows that the coeﬃcient on the freight
variable is negative and signiﬁcant; this suggests that higher potential freight costs reduce
the probability of being in the sample. In the second stage, we include the inverse mills
ratio from the ﬁrst stage regression, which is signiﬁcant, implying that the error terms in
both regressions are correlated. However, the results in the second step (column 7) indicate
that the main coeﬃcients of interest are unchanged from the baseline speciﬁcations. Thus,
our results remain robust to controlling for potential selection biases.28
6. Conclusion
The search for policies to encourage innovation has been a major challenge for govern-
ments around the world. This paper shows that increasing competition by lowering import
tariﬀs is associated with faster quality upgrading — an important component of innovation
28The results are also robust to including tariﬀs and growth in world exports in the ﬁrst-stage probit, but
t h es a m p l ei ss m a l l e rb e c a u s ew ed on o th a v et a r i ﬀ information for all censored varieties.Competition and Quality Upgrading 22
— only if the product is close to the world technology frontier. For products distant from
the world technology frontier, lower tariﬀs discourage quality upgrading. These ﬁndings are
supportive of theories by ABGHP (2009) and consistent with more recent empirical studies
that have also found a nonmonotonic relationship between growth and competition.
We build on previous studies by analyzing this relationship for highly disaggregated
products for countries that span a wide income distribution. We overcome diﬃculties faced
by other studies, which focus either on within country or aggregate cross-country analysis,
by adopting a novel approach to measure quality, based on Khandelwal (forthcoming),
which provides quality estimates that are internationally comparable. The advantage of
this approach is that it enables us to control for country-year speciﬁce ﬀects such as changes
in institutions that could be correlated with industry competition measures.
Our results show that support is strongest for countries characterized by good business
climates, which is perhaps not surprising given that lower tariﬀs are unlikely to signiﬁcantly
alter competitive environments in countries that face many other restrictions to competition.
Interestingly, the nonmonotonic relationship between competition and quality upgrading
holds for both OECD and non-OECD characterized by strong business climates. Thus,
our results suggest that a minimum institutional quality, and not simply higher income per
capita, is required for the two opposing forces in AGHP to operate.
These ﬁndings also suggest that initial heterogeneity in industry characteristics is im-
portant for understanding subsequent industry performance following trade liberalizations.
In particular, aggregate implications of industry-level trade models, such as Melitz (2003),
may diﬀer according to the industry’s initial distance to the world frontier. Further research
on the implications of this heterogeneity may therefore be important.
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7. Tables and Figures
Variables OECD Non‐OECD High DB Low DB
ΔQualitycht 0.277 0.405 0.287 0.449
(1.116) (1.074) (1.111) (1.063)
PFcht‐5 0.508 0.559 0.520 0.557
(0.351) (0.332) (0.347) (0.333)
Tariffc,h6,t‐5 0.076 0.251 0.091 0.310
(0.061) (0.262) (0.104) (0.280)
C o u n t r i e s 2 03 62 92 7














Table 1: Summary StaticsCompetition and Quality Upgrading 27
PFcht‐5 ‐0.823 ***
0.014    
Tariffc,h6,t‐5 0.207 *** ‐0.070 **  0.214 ***















Product‐Year FEs yes yes yes yes
Country‐Year FEs no  yes yes yes
R‐squared 0.54     0.54 0.58     0.58
Observations 131,257     131,257 131,257     131,257













Table 2: Quality Upgrading, Competition, and Distance to FrontierCompetition and Quality Upgrading 28
Regressors (1) (2a) (2b) (3)
Countries Above Median DB
PFcht‐5 ‐0.769 *** ‐0.739 *** ‐0.836 *** ‐0.810 ***
0.017     0.021     0.027     0.019    
Tariffc,h6,t‐5  0.438 *** 0.420 **  0.413 *** 0.524 ***
0.089     0.167     0.104     0.094    
PFcht‐5 X Tariffc,h6,t‐5  ‐0.790 *** ‐0.991 *** ‐0.622 *** ‐0.907 ***
0.111     0.221     0.130     0.119    
Countries Below Median DB
PFcht‐5 ‐0.992 *** ‐0.652 *** ‐1.037 ***
0.026     0.114     0.027    
Tariffc,h6,t‐5  0.033     0.590     ‐0.017    
0.058     0.702     0.059    
PFcht‐5 X Tariffc,h6,t‐5 ‐0.121 ** ‐ 0.740     ‐0.051    
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Regressors
PFcht‐5 ‐1.025 *** ‐0.784 *** ‐0.778 *** ‐0.868 *** ‐1.106 ***
0.024     0.022     0.017     0.019     0.018    
Tariffc,h6,t‐5 0.423 *** 0.529 *** 0.511 *** 0.424 *** 0.285 ***
         0.099     0.123     0.094     0.095     0.059    
PFcht‐5 X Tariffc,h6,t‐5 ‐0.726 *** ‐0.774 *** ‐0.841 *** ‐0.883 *** ‐0.496 ***
0.127     0.146     0.115     0.117     0.115    
Product‐Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes
Country‐Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes
R‐squared 0.58 0.586 0.584 0.57 0.214


























Table 5: Alternative Proxy to Frontier MeasuresCompetition and Quality Upgrading 31
Regressors
PFcht‐5 ‐0.815 *** ‐0.806 *** ‐1.180 *** ‐1.156 *** ‐0.436 *** ‐0.818 ***
0.019     0.019     0.057     0.044     0.036     0.019    
Tariffc,h6,t‐5 0.511 *** 0.487 *** 0.431 **  0.538 ***
         0.100     0.095     0.195     0.094    
PFcht‐5 X Tariffc,h6,t‐5 ‐0.907 *** ‐0.870 *** ‐0.769 *** ‐0.913 ***













Product‐Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes no yes
HS2‐Year F E s n on on on on oy e sn o
Country‐Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R‐squared 0.58 0.59 0.623 0.65 0.07 0.17 0.58
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Figure 2: Predict Quality Growth and Proximity to Frontier